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As cities in the developing world grow, their poor residents are
being deprived of services, especially water, sewer, and solid
waste collection, that can only be purchased expensively in
private markets.  But the inadequate provision of urban
environmental services is not inevitable.  A lack of will in this
respect is partly due to an ambivalent attitude toward city
growth and a widespread feeling that rural-urban migration is
excessive.  Provision of optimal urban environmental services is
also expensive.  While the budget problems are exacerbated by
foolish pricing policies and cost inefficiencies, it may not be
feasible for developing countries to provide all urban residents
with optimal service levels.  There are many ways to provide
basic services to poor residents.
"Urbanization is...expensive.  The difference between the costs
of urban development and rural development does not turn on the
difference of capital required for factories and that required
for farms.  Each of these is a small part of total investment....
The difference turns on infrastructure...." (Lewis 1978: 39)
"Virtually all Third World governments have failed to ensure that
rapid urban growth has been accompanied by investments in
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The rapidly growing cities of developing countries pose
increasingly serious environmental problems for their residents.
This paper looks at the policy choices that governments of the
developing countries have made and can make to improve their
environments, especially for their poor residents.  It focuses on
the provision of drinking water, sewage, and solid waste disposal
services.
The word, "environment," is used here to mean those goods and
services (hereafter, services) that affect an individual's
welfare but whose consumption is largely outside the individual's
control.  Environmental services are not sold in the marketplace.
There are four main reasons that free markets fail to provide
certain environmental services to consumers:
1. Technically efficient provision of some services requires
economies of scale and a single producer, precluding private
competition.  Examples: urban infrastructure, drinking water, and
sewage.
2. The provision and consumption of some services generates
externalities.  If a provider's or consumer's actions directly
increase the costs of other providers or decrease the well-being
of other consumers, the potential efficiency of market activities
is subverted [note 1].  Examples: waste generation -- solid,
hazardous, nuclear -- and inappropriate waste disposal.3. Some "goods" or services are, partially at least, collectively
consumed.  The decision to consume is not made by individuals
through their market actions, the consumption of one individual
does not preclude consumption by others, or it is costly to
prevent consumption by people who will not pay for the service
[note 2].  Examples: clean air and rivers, vermin-free and
litter-free streets, sidewalks, and streetlights.
4. Many services are considered "merit goods" because a minimal
supply of them is ensured through the political process rather
than being left to the uncertainties of the marketplace [note 3].
Examples: minimal shelter, primary education, clean drinking
water, basic sanitation, and access to basic health care [note
4].
For many aspects of the environment, it makes little difference
whether the context is urban or rural.  For example, primary
schooling and access to health care are just as much merit
services for rural as for urban children.  But environmental
concerns are often much more acute in cities.  Economies of scale
in production and delivery are only important when the consuming
population is sufficiently clustered to benefit.  External costs
are only imposed when there are many other consumers and
providers in sufficiently close proximity to suffer from them.
Collective consumption only becomes significant when people live
densely.  Cities produce -- that is the reason for their being --
but they also have high environmental costs.
Governments, therefore, have become involved in the provision of
environmental amenities to their urban citizens.  The extent and
quality of service varies greatly across countries.   It is not
surprising that poorer countries provide less.  But it is
surprising that provision varies across countries with similar
GDP per capita.
Municipal governments in developing countries provide services
both directly by taxing and indirectly through subsidization and
regulation of private providers.  Pricing and cost recovery
through user fees also vary across countries.
The efforts of these cities to provide basic environmental
services to all residents have rarely been successful.  Many
cities provide excellent amenities to some residents and almost
none at all to others.  There are many explanations for this lack
of success.
One explanation is that because the cities have grown so fast and
large, immediate, universal provision of basic services is just
too big a task for them to do with public resources.  This paper
argues that because the urban environment is highly valued by
consumers and cannot be adequately serviced by the private
sector, it must be a high priority for the use of public
resources.
A second explanation is budgetary.  The provision of urbanamenities is usually the concern of municipal government finance;
and municipal budgets, especially in developing countries, face
inadequate and inelastic revenue bases.  Therefore, everything
dependent on city budgets suffers.  The World Bank, 1988, puts it
succinctly:
"Municipalities face tight budgetary constraints.... Traditional
ways of raising revenue are becoming increasingly costly.
Transfers from higher tiers of government are unreliable, and
many local authorities have neither the authority nor the
know-how to coax more out of the property tax.  Services that
depend heavily on general funding sources are therefore bound to
suffer" (: 144f).
A third explanation is political.  Urban, as well as national,
governments in developing countries are seen as "elitist" --
concerned primarily with providing amenities to those already
relatively well off.  Those very amenities that are badly
provided to the poor are usually well provided to the rich.  The
pro-rich bias of public policies is an unfortunate fact.
A fourth explanation concerns the way in which the cities produce
and distribute amenities.  It sees municipal provision as rife
with corruption and inefficiency, which means that the city's
services are inadequate or high-cost.  This leads to excessive
demands for these services, causes huge operating deficits, and
produces steadily deteriorating quality and quantity.  The
implication for equity is that new, often poor, neighborhoods are
especially badly served, compared with established neighborhoods.
A final explanation sees urban migration in developing countries
as excessive, as a dampening force on economic development that
must be discouraged.  Thus, the provision of services to new
urban migrants simply makes it harder to discourage rural-urban
migration.  Improving the urban environment would suck new,
unwanted, and unproductive migrants into the cities.
The view that rural-urban migration retards development stems
from a naive application of the Todaro model of the late 1960s
[note 5].  Urban wage levels are made artificially high by some
combination of government minimum wage policies, labor union
pressures, or oligopolistic rent-sharing [note 6[.  This attracts
migrants from the low-wage rural areas at a pace far in excess of
the ability of the urban industrial sector to create jobs.  The
equilibrating force becomes urban unemployment, with equilibrium
reached when the rural wage (or marginal or average product in
agriculture) equals the  average urban wage -- where that average
is some weighted mixture of high wage rates for the modern-sector
employed, low wage rates for the informal-sector underemployed,
and zero wage rates for the urban unemployed.
An ingenious theory.  But research over the last two decades has
shown it to be largely wrong.  Wages in the informal sector are
not low, and labor there is not unproductive.  Overt unemployment
is rare, especially among the low-skilled new immigrants.  And
urban wages are not terribly high, once adjusted for greater
education, higher costs, higher rents, congestion, andenvironmental disamenities [note 7].  There is indeed an "urban
bias" to most developing country policy (Lipton 1976), but it is
a bias against the rural population and a bias toward the
better-off segments of the urban population.  These biases are
not corrected by adding a bias against the urban poor [note 8].
The failure to provide basic environmental services to the urban
poor is in itself the most vicious of all possible policy biases.
For most services that the urban poor need, there are
private-sector sources available, often at better quality or
lower cost than the public sector can offer.  But environmental
necessities -- fraught as they are with elements of natural
monopoly, public services, externalities, and merit services --
are badly provided by the private sector.  If water, sewage, and
refuse disposal are not made available by a public body, either
they will not be made available at all or they will be too
expensive for the poor to afford.
The ultimate irony of the developing country city is that its
amenities, often thought to be equally available to all citizens,
are generally better provided to the better-off -- sometimes even
at subsidized prices for those who least need the subsidy:
"Urban poverty is not simply a matter of individual income; it is
part of the spatial and physical organization of the cities....
Many city roads, especially on the outskirts, are unpaved; public
water supply reaches low-income areas of the city through public
hydrants serving a large number of families; and adequate sewage
disposal systems serve only a small proportion of the urban
population.  Health facilities are unevenly concentrated in the
richer areas..." (Roberts 1978: 137).
The rest of this paper is concerned with this irony, its sources,
and possible meliorations.
THE CITY AND GROWTH IN THEORY AND HISTORY
Developing country governments want economic growth but think
their cities are too large [note 9].  Yet theory and history tell
us that economic growth and city growth go together.  This
contradiction has tremendous implications for the urban
environments of the developing countries, especially as they
affect the poor.
Think of a small, very poor, developing country that is initially
almost entirely agricultural.  People are poor because they grow
little or no surplus that they might sell to buy non-agricultural
products. Because there is thus no demand for such production,
people remain in farming.  To develop, the country must generate
an agricultural surplus.Once surpluses appear, two possible development strategies
emerge.  The country could remain dominantly agricultural, export
its surplus, and import newly demanded manufactures [note 10].
But distance, culture, and policy usually take it onto a
different track.  Labor no longer needed in agriculture for
domestic food requirements moves into manufacturing, and the
surplus is traded to the cities for manufactures.  Manufacturing
growth, needing the economies of scale and agglomeration effects
that cities provide, has always meant urban growth [note 11].
Thus when its cities grow economically, a country grows and a
shrinking proportion of the population is needed just to produce
food.
City growth also accelerates overall economic growth whenever
industrial productivity increases more rapidly than agricultural
productivity -- as it usually has.  Higher agricultural
productivity not only releases labor for manufacturing, it
releases that labor to a sector where productivity is greater and
growing more rapidly.
There is, however, a downside to city growth.  Congested cities
have high welfare costs, which are passed on to manufacturing
employers, who must pay higher wages in order to attract labor.
And cities have higher living costs -- principally higher rents,
as urban land becomes scarce, and higher prices for consumer
services, as retailing and transport chains become more complex
-- which are passed on as higher labor costs to employers.
Finally, the greater need for public provision of environmental
services involves higher costs.
Not all cities provide optimal environmental services;  if they
do not, the lack of services is a burden on employers, who must
pay higher wages.  This rise in wage rates will add more to the
wage bill than the taxation needed to finance the optimal
provision of amenities would have cost.  Thus, the failure to
provide optimal environmental amenities in cities not only causes
personal hardship, it also retards industrial growth.
The linkage between economic growth and city growth is obvious.
Why then do many developing countries not recognize their rapidly
growing cities as a sign of the success, not failure, of their
development strategies?  The answer to this paradox is that these
strategies have been largely anti-rural.  They have depressed
both the terms of trade of agriculture and the rural share of the
government infrastructure and service budgets.  And policies
promoting import-substitution industrialization have encouraged
excessively capital-intensive and import-intensive industry,
which in turn has meant a slower growth of formal-sector
employment in the cities.
Such policies excessively push labor from the rural areas and
inadequately generate formal-sector jobs for urban migrants.  In
this sense, many developing countries are over-urbanized.  And if
informal jobs are seen as unproductive or cause underemployment,
many developing countries may consider their rates of
urbanization even more excessive.  But it does seem an
abomination that the urban poor should be made to pay for thesebad policies and misconceptions by being forced to do without the
very services and services that they cannot readily buy in the
private marketplace.  It is ironic that the very policies that
are intended to lift the developing country out of poverty fail
to extend much of that growth to the very poorest, in both the
rural and urban areas.
Many developing country policies inefficiently slow growth rates
and push labor from rural areas.  Yet, in a net sense,
urbanization still accompanies growth.  Developing country cities
are growing more rapidly in countries where the real GDP (and
growth in real GDP) per capita is higher (Preston 1979: 203).
Furthermore, the rate of urbanization of developing cities is not
high by historical standards.  The percentage of the developing
country population in cities grew from 17 to 28% between 1950 and
1975, almost exactly the percentage change that occurred in the
now-industrialized countries between 1875 and 1900 ("ibid.":
196).  "...by the standards of the First Industrial Revolution,
the urban transition associated with ongoing industrial
revolution in the Third World hardly seems exceptional"
(Williamson 1988: 430).
Yet, today's developing countries face different problems in
providing their urban poor with environmental services.
First, population growth rates are much higher in developing
countries than in the now-industrialized world a century ago.
Comparable rates of urbanization mean much larger rates of growth
in developing country cities.  In turn, each year the numbers of
newly born plus newly immigrated city-dwellers waiting for
services is larger than the now-industrialized countries ever
faced.  If there are economies of scale in providing these
amenities, this means a lower cost per capita, but it none-
theless means a higher total cost.  Even if high population
growth rates do not cause lower levels or growth rates of GDP per
capita, they do deflect public expenditure away from investment
in manufacturing and agriculture and toward investment in urban
and rural infrastructure [note 12].
Second, industrialization in the developing countries is
occurring at a lower per capita income than in the now-
industrialized countries.  For example, while urbanization in
Latin America (the richest part of the developing world) is
roughly 30 years behind that of the United States, income per
capita there approximates that in the United States in the latter
half of the nineteenth century (Ingram and Carroll 1981: 269).
Thus, the resources available in today's developing country
cities -- for environmental services as well as for food and
clothing -- are not as great, per capita, as they were in earlier
industrializations.
Finally, nineteenth-century industrialization and urbanization
were undertaken "on the cheap."  Urban services were always
provided belatedly and inadequately, especially in the
working-class sections of town [note 13].  Hobsbawm, 1969, writes
of British cities during the first half of the nineteenthcentury:
"Smoke hung over them and filth impregnated them...the elementary
public services -- water supply, sanitation, street-cleaning,
open spaces, and so on -- could not keep pace with the mass
migration of men into the cities, thus producing, especially
after 1830, epidemics of cholera, typhoid....New city
populations...pressed into overcrowded and bleak slums, whose
very sight froze the heart of the observer (: 86)."
Life expectancy for the urban poor thus was lower than that in
the rural areas [note 14].4  This is what led Engels to label
British rural-urban migration as "social murder" (Engels 1987:
70)[note 15].  Workers' wages, consumption, and welfare rose in
the second half of the nineteenth century in Great Britain, but
not because of any widespread provision of water, sewage, and
refuse collection [note 16].  But this under-provision is no
longer defensible.  Developing country cities cannot "bury" their
social problems until industrialization is further along.
THE PROVISION OF URBAN ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
The basic urban services are clean drinking water, sanitary
facilities, and solid waste collection.
Clean drinking water has been a concern of development thinking
for three decades.  The Twelfth World Health Assembly initiated
the Community Water Supply Program in 1959.  By the end of the
1970s, the United Nations (UN) called for continued international
efforts to bring water and sanitation to all the people in
developing countries.  In November 1980, the UN General Assembly
designated the 1980s as the International Drinking Water Supply
and Sanitation Decade.  In the 1980s, more than a billion and a
half people were provided with access to safe drinking water, and
nearly three-quarters of a billion were given access to
sanitation (World Bank 1992b: 47; and Singh and Helweg 1990: 23).
Despite this impressive progress, the goal of providing safe
water and sanitation to all people in the developing countries is
far from being accomplished.  In 1990, nearly one-quarter billion
people in the urban areas of developing countries were still
without potable water and more than one-quarter billion still had
no sanitation (World Bank 1992b: 47; UNDP 1991: 136f; and Singh
and Helweg 1990: 16).
The steady rise in the coverage rate in safe water for urban
residents in developing countries is shown in figure 1.  Despite
decades of international efforts, 18% of the residents are still
without safe water, 28% are without sanitation facilities, and
30-50% are without solid waste collection.  The regional
breakdown for the coverage rates in water and sanitation is
summarized in table 1.  At the current pace, universal coveragecannot be expected for another 40 years.
An illustration of the diversity of water and sewage service
across households of different incomes and cities of different
sizes comes from Malaysia (Meerman 1979) -- see table 2.  Higher-
income groups and larger cities have a higher proportion of both
water and sewage connections, and sewage lags behind water.
The collection and disposal of solid waste in the developing
countries have not received much attention.  This lack of
attention is not, however, an indication that the problem is less
severe.  The annual per capita generation of solid waste in the
developing countries is between about 0.2 and 0.3 tons, less than
half the rate in the industrialized countries (Cointreau-Levine
1991: 10).  Table 3 shows generation for a number of large
developing cities.
The magnitude of the problem is, however, only partially
reflected in the astronomical amount of solid waste generated
each year.  Although the rate of per capita waste generation in
developing countries is less than half that of industrialized
countries, the income levels in these countries are a much lower
percentage of income levels in industrialized countries.
Contrary to popular belief, the volume of solid waste generated
declines, as a percentage of output, as development proceeds
[note 17].  This means that the developing countries:
1) are generating relatively more solid waste per unit of output
than the industrialized countries; and
2) are relatively more constrained, with respect to their
resources, in coping with solid waste collection and disposal.
Only 50% to 70% of urban residents in the developing countries
receive collection service despite the fact that solid waste
management typically absorbs 20% to 50% of municipal revenues
(Cointreau-Levine 1991: 2); moreover, only 60% to 70% of the
refuse is collected (Bartone "et al." 1991: 495).  Thus, each
year, over 100 million tons of solid waste accumulate in the
cities of developing countries.  Even less attention is paid to
waste disposal than to waste collection.  On average, developing
countries allocate less than 5% of municipal budgets for solid
waste to disposal.  The comparable percentage in the
industrialized countries is 20% to 30%.  In developing countries,
open dumping is the most common means of disposal (Bartone 1990b:
1).
Why are these services so inadequately provided?  It is widely
believed that developing countries simply do not have sufficient
economic resources for full provision.  The coverage rates for
water and sanitation do tend to be lower for those developing
countries with lower GNP per capita, as indicated in figure 2,
(see also Shafik and Bandyopadhyay 1992).  The level and growth
rate of GNP per capita are not, however, the only factors in the
determination of a country's provision of urban services:
"Failure to achieve coverage targets in the 1980s has as much todo with the manner in which funding sources have been mobilized,
allocated, and used as with the absolute level of resources
available (UNDP-World Band and Sanitation Program 1990: 13)."
For instance, each country's performance, as indicated by figure
2, clearly indicates that the dispersion in the coverage rates
for individual nations is very large for any given level of GNP
per capita.  Many countries with a much smaller GNP per capita
outperform the countries with a relatively higher one [note 18].
Figure 3 shows that not only is the dispersion of coverage rates
large for any given growth rate, but also that the distribution
of the coverage rates over growth rates is essentially random.
Another factor that may determine coverage rates is the rapid
population growth experienced by developing countries.  In 1980,
3.3 billion people lived in developing countries; by 1990, 4.0
billion (Singh and Helweg 1990: 3).  Rapid population growth in
developing countries is usually thought to retard development,
and hence limit a country's ability to devote resources to
improved environmental service coverage.  In sub-Saharan Africa,
for instance, population growth was about 3% throughout
the 1980s.  Just to maintain the coverage rate of 1990 at the
level of 1980, the service provision would have had to increase
by more than 34% for that decade (Institution of Civil Engineers
1990: 1).  However, as figure 4 indicates, there does not seem to
be any simple monotonic relationship between water and sanitation
coverage rates and population growth rates.  The dispersion in
the coverage rates for any given rate of population growth is
also quite large.  Some countries seem to accommodate population
growth better than others in terms of coverage rates.
Figures 2 through 4 make it clear that there is a great deal of
variance in water and sanitation effort among countries at
similar levels of GNP per capita, of GNP per capita growth, and
of population growth.  This should not be surprising.  A nation's
expenditure on water and sanitation and, to a less extent, on
solid waste is typically a very small fraction of its total
output.  Public investment in water and sanitation in the 1980s,
for instance, accounted for only 10% of total public investment
in the developing countries -- or roughly 0.6% of GDP (World Bank
1992b: 106).  When the total is so small, investment priorities,
rather than resource constraints, are the more important
determinants of expenditure.
Urbanization has also been suggested as an adverse factor in the
improvement of the coverage rates and waste management.  In 1960,
urban residents of the developing countries accounted for 22% of
their total population; by 1990, 37% (UNDP 1991: 159).  In
Africa, for instance, urban population in the 1980s grew at an
annual rate of roughly 5.5%; in comparison, population growth was
3.2% [note 19].  In the meantime, the urban water supply coverage
rate in Africa dropped from 83% to 74% (Institution of Civil
Engineers 1990: 1).  The fast pace of urbanization in the
developing countries is thought to have simply outgrown, so to
speak, the ability to expand urban infrastructure.
Yet, a closer look at the cross-sectional data on theurbanization and coverage rates for water and sanitation seems to
contradict this casual hypothesis.  As figure 5 indicates, the
countries with high percentages of urban population tend to have
higher coverage rates.
While rapid urbanization stretches infrastructure, it could also
provide an impetus for the rapid expansion of urban services.
Urban centers in developing countries are frequently the centers
of productive activities, where one-third of total population
produces 60% of GNP (Bartone 1991: 412).  Urbanization does not
simply consume resources -- it also creates them.  Further, rapid
urbanization can focus public attention on the provision of
services, increase popular awareness of urban problems, and
generate greater political will to expand basic urban services.
Precisely how the various macroeconomic variables relate to the
adequacy of urban water supply, sanitation, and waste management
cannot be established by mere regression analysis.  But
regression relationships can be suggestive, as shown in table 4
[note 20].  There are two things to especially note in the table:
1. The only statistically significant explanatory variable in any
of the four regressions is the urbanization percentage.  It is
significant in all four regressions.  And contrary to
conventional wisdom, urbanization is positively related to
coverage rates.  The more urbanized the developing country, the
more completely covered is its urban population with water and
sewage service.
2. None of the first three explanatory variables has significant
(or approximately significant) coefficients in any of the four
regressions.  There is, in short, no evidence in this sample of
developing countries that the level of GNP per capita, its growth
rate, or the growth rate of population have any consistent,
cross-country impact on the extent to which the urban population
is served with water or sanitation.
These regression results suggest that the macroeconomic
constraints seem not to be binding when it comes to providing
water and sanitation coverage to a developing country's urban
population [note 21].  In retrospect, this is hardly surprising.
Relative to GNP, or even relative to the total public investment
budget, the investments are not large.  These investments do,
after all, stem from policy decisions that can vary.  And
urbanization itself seems to induce policy makers to better
provide water and sanitation in cities.
Figure 1.  Urban Developing Country Drinking Water Coverage Rate,
1970-1990
Table 1. Water Supply and Sanitation Coverage for Urban Residents
in Developing Countries by Region, 1980 and 1990
----------------------------------------------------------------
                                Percent Covered
Region                        1980            1990Africa --
  Water                        83%             87%
  Sanitation                   65              79
Latin America and the Caribbean --
  Water                        82              87
  Sanitation                   78              79
Asia and the Pacific --
  Water                        73              77
  Sanitation                   65              65
Western Asia and Middle East --
  Water                        95             100
  Sanitation                   79             100
----------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Singh and Helweg 1990: 16.
Table 2. Households with Water and Sewage
----------------------------------------------------------------
              (by income quintile and city size)
Households Served             Water [note 1]      Sewage [note 2]
  By Income Quintile:
    Lowest                        23%                   3%
    2nd                           47                   10
    3rd                           52                   19
    4th                           68                   29
    Highest                       83                   56
  By Size of City of Residence
    >75 Thousand                  88%                  62%
    10-75 Thousand                58                   28
    1-10 Thousand                 63                   26
    <1 Thousand                   46                   16
----------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
  1. Piped and treated water.
  2. Flush sewage disposal.
Source: Meerman 1979: 624.
Table 3. Waste Generation in Some Large Developing Country Urban
Centers
----------------------------------------------------------------
                              Waste Generation (tons)
                      Population        Daily          Annual
City                  (millions)        Total          Per Capita
Abidjan (Ivory Coast)      1.7          1,400           0.300
Bangkok (Thailand)         6.0          2,500           0.152
Cairo (Egypt)              8.5          4,000           0.172
Colombo (Sri Lanka)        0.8            445           0.191
Douala (Cameroon)          0.8          1,120           0.499
Manila (Philippines)       8.0          2,700           0.123
Mexico City (Mexico)      17.0          6,510           0.140
----------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Cointreau 1987, "passim."Figure 2. Developing Country Urban Coverage Rates and GNP per
Capita.  Source: WHO 1984; and UNDP 1991.
Figure 3. Developing Country Urban Coverage Rates and GNP per
Capita Growth Rates.  Source: WHO 1984; and UNDP 1991.
Figure 4. Developing Country Urban Coverage Rates and Population
Growth Rates.  Source: WHO 1984; and UNDP 1991.
Figure 5. Developing Country Urban Coverage Rates and
Urbanization.  Source: WHO 1984; and UNDP 1991.
Table 4. Water and Sanitation Coverage Regression Analysis
----------------------------------------------------------------
(a) Water Coverage (%, 1980):
                              Regression Coefficients
Variable                      Tobit               OLS
Constant Term                 63.10             63.24
                              (3.29)            (4.25)
GNP Per Capita                -0.07              0.25
  ($000s, 1980)              (-0.07)            (0.28)
GNP/Pop Growth Rate           -0.43             -0.44
  (% p.a., 1980s)            (-0.33)           (-0.43)
Pop Growth Rate               -3.92             -2.60
  (% p.a., 1980s)            (-0.68)           (-0.54)
Urbanization                   0.63              0.43
  (%, 1980)                   (3.49)            (3.09)
                                              R2=0.26
(b) Sanitation Coverage (%, 1980):
                              Regression Coefficients
Variable                      Tobit               OLS
Constant Term                 31.07             29.31
                              (1.39)            (1.50)
GNP Per Capita                 0.85              0.71
  ($000s, 1980)               (0.64)            (0.60)
GNP/Pop Growth Rate            1.72              1.16
  (% p.a., 1980s)             (1.07)            (0.86)
Pop Growth Rate                4.41              4.99
  (% p.a., 1980s)             (0.62)            (0.79)
Urbanization                   0.61              0.54
  (%, 1980)                   (2.78)            (2.89)
                                              R2=0.22
----------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
  1. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics.
  2. p.a. means per annum.
  3. 1980s refers to 1980-88.COST AND PRICE STRUCTURES
The next step after concern with service provision is attention
to economics, more specifically, costs and prices.  Prices
determine both who gets the services and what revenues are
available to cover costs.  Revenues and budget constraints
determine what costs can be afforded and eventually who can be
provided with what kind of service.  In all industries, revenue
and cost are interrelated.  But the interrelation is uniquely
complex for urban environmental services.
The provision of infrastructure for water and sewage is a classic
example of natural monopoly.  There are large economies of scale
and of contiguity -- that is, inefficiency in providing duplicate
distribution networks in an area -- with high fixed cost and low
marginal cost.  Under these conditions, marginal cost pricing
leads to financial loss, while pricing to fully recover all costs
leads to inefficiently low levels of service.  In solid waste
management, there are fewer characteristics of natural monopoly,
but the public-good nature of its benefits also tends to cause
under-provision of the service.
Many developing country cities have erred on the low side in
pricing decisions, causing financial losses that have led to
inadequate coverage and deteriorating service.  Even though many
developing country cities have set the fees for public utilities
below relevant costs, the results tend to be highly regressive.
Wealthy households receive public amenities below cost, while
poor families are unserved and must rely on costly, often
low-quality, private alternatives or no service at all.  How have




Capital cost in the water sector involves the cost of securing
water supplies ("i.e.", deep wells and pumps to acquire
groundwater or large reservoirs to collect surface water),
constructing treatment facilities, and laying out the
distribution network.  The costs of such systems vary widely, but
World Bank economists (Garn 1987: 229) have estimated a general
cost equation (for a water project with a design horizon of 10-15
years):
    TCC = 4*Q[0.67],
where TCC is the total capital cost (in millions of 1980 dollars)
and Q is the expected quantity of water produced at capacity (in
millions of cubic meters per year)[note 22].  By this formula, anew water system for a city of 3 million people, consuming an
average of 80 liters per capita per day, would incur a total
capital cost amounting to $80 million or an average capital cost
of $26 per capita.  A similar system for a city of half a million
people would require a total capital cost of $24 million or $48
per person.  The higher per-person cost in the smaller city is a
reflection of the economy-of-scale exponent of two-thirds.
Once a city has installed its fixed capital, the marginal cost of
adding connections to individual houses or to standposts in
neighborhoods is relatively low.  Typically, individual household
connections ("i.e.", in-house taps for running water) cost more
than $100 each; yard or neighborhood taps cost $30-50 each,
depending on the spacing.  World Bank economists have estimated
that the incremental cost of increasing coverage through house
connections to 90% of developing country urban populations (and
through sewage connections to 70%) by the year 2000 amounts to
only $8 per capita per year (Ringskog 1987: 233) [note 23].
However, trying to add many tertiary connections ("i.e.",
small-diameter pipes appropriate for servicing a sub-division) to
an overburdened primary ("i.e.", trunk) network often leads to
substantial inefficiencies.
"[It] becomes more difficult and sometimes impossible to build
trunk infrastructure after neighborhoods are fully established.
The result is often an abundance of tertiary networks and a
shortage of primary and secondary networks (World Bank 1992a:
48)."
An inefficient mix of primary, secondary, and tertiary
infrastructure increases per-unit cost.  However, in slums and
squatter settlements, many of the poor are not serviced at all,
while others help themselves to illegal connections.
The variable ("i.e." recurrent) costs of a water system are very
low relative to the fixed cost.  For a groundwater system, they
include the energy cost of pumping the water and other operation
and maintenance costs of the system.  Usually, surface water
requires more extensive treatment than does groundwater, but
surface water does not incur the heavy pumping cost.  The
operation and maintenance costs for 54 urban water projects
financed by the World Bank, which included both surface and
groundwater sources, averaged less than $0.20 per cubic meter (as
of 1980; Garn 1987: 232) [note 24].
Sewage Costs
A sewage system also has high fixed cost in the network of trunk
sewers and in the facility for centralized treatment and
discharge, while the capital cost of adding households to the
system is relatively low.  For example, the World Bank, 1992b,
estimates that complete, standard sewage systems in the
Developing World cost $300 to $1000 per connected household (:
107) [note 25]; connecting up an existing sewer connection for a
flush toilet costs about $200 (Linn 1983: 149).A system for Taipei (Taiwan) designed in 1970, when the
population was 3 million and growing at a rate of 5% per year,
was estimated to take 36 years to complete, reaching 4.7 million
people by time of completion.  The construction cost was
estimated at $300-500 million per year; operation and maintenance
costs were expected to grow from about $10 million per year to
almost $300 million per year by the end of the project (McGarry
1982b: 133) [note 26].  For Kumasi (Ghana), a densely populated
city of 600,000, capital cost (without treatment facilities)
would amount to about $500 per household.  Household connections
and fixtures would add another $100-300 (Whittington "et al."
1991a: 124).
Industrial sewage is more likely to contain hazardous or toxic
wastes and higher concentrations of contaminants than is
household sewage.  Most municipalities either require industrial
sewage to be "pre-treated" to established standards or make
arrangements for individual firms to fully treat their effluent
before direct discharge into surface water.  However, enforcement
in developing countries is often lax, and sewage treatment plants
(if they exist) may have to deal with effluents for which they
are not equipped (Bernstein 1991: 35).
Solid Waste Costs
Solid waste collection and disposal service do not exhibit the
massive economies of scale that water and sewage systems do.
Private firms can profitably collect solid waste in free markets
-- and the resulting prices may well approximate the lowest
feasible per-unit cost.  Recent estimates for urban areas in the
industrialized countries suggest that there are significant
economies of scale for a population of up to about 20-30,000 but
not further above 50,000.  Given the lower wages in developing
countries, and the concomitantly more labor-intensive processes
used there ("e.g.", fewer and simpler vehicles staffed with more
workers), economies of scale are likely to be exhausted at even
lower population levels in developing countries (Schertenleib and
Triche 1989: 13, 17).
Solid waste collection can be a very labor-intensive undertaking,
with relatively small capital outlay. Most collection services in
developing countries include a sizable crew of unskilled
laborers, equipped with shovels and rakes, baskets or bins,
wheelbarrows or push-carts, and a dump-truck or a cart with a
draft animal.  In larger urban areas, there will often be
transfer stations where household garbage from an entire
neighborhood will be collected and temporarily stored awaiting
pickup for final disposal in an official dump site.
Even if there are few economies of scale, there are significant
economies of contiguity.  It is more efficient to have one firm
or agency service a neighborhood than two or more wasting time
and fuel leapfrogging each other.  Thus, efficient collection,
which requires monopoly, may be in conflict with efficient
pricing, which requires competition.  And efficientsource-reduction efforts in solid waste, which require higher
per-bag charges, may be in conflict with efficient litter-control
(and "anti-midnight-dumping") efforts, which require low (or
zero) per-bag or per-bin charges.  These potential conflicts urge
public, rather than private for-profit, provision of the solid
waste collection system.
Furthermore, there may be significantly greater economies of
scale at the level of secondary collection, processing, and
disposal -- proper treatment of solid waste after its collection
increasingly involves transfer stations, organized recycling,
enclosed incineration, municipal composting areas, and sanitary
landfills (with post-closure monitoring).  In each of these
areas, greater size means lower cost per unit of solid waste,
which again suggests public involvement.
A final argument for public intervention in solid waste disposal
is that many of the costs, while not technically externalities,
are distant and uncertain and that such costs may be too easily
escaped by private firms [note 27].  Especially in the case of
landfills, the concepts and estimates of the true economic cost
are particularly elusive:
"A particular landfill, once filled to capacity, is essentially
unusable forever for further solid waste disposal...a new
landfill must be located, prepared, and opened.  This process of
closing and opening goes on again and again, periodically, and it
comprises the major cost of the entire waste disposal
operation....[Disposal cost includes] not only all the handling
costs at the landfill but also some part of this infinite
sequence of closing and opening new landfills.  What part,
exactly?  To find the marginal cost of, say, one extra ton of
solid waste...,we would have to take account of the fact that the
date of closing Phase I and opening Phase II would thereby have
been accelerated a little bit, and that these earlier costs would
have represented, in a 1990 present value sense, higher costs.
But that same bit of 1960 solid waste would also have hastened
the day when Phase II was closed and Phase III opened.  Indeed,
it would hasten the closings and openings of all future phases,
forever after.  So, finding the "cost" of a landfill for the
purpose of discovering marginal cost and helping to set "tipping
fees" theoretically requires us to look at all future
closing-and-opening landfill costs (Bitar and Porter 1991: 4)."
Landfills also pose administrative problems.  Enforcing proper
post-closure monitoring of private landfills almost certainly
exceeds the abilities of developing country regulators -- just as
in industrialized countries.
In poorer developing countries, however, urban solid waste
usually gets dumped in ill-prepared landfills, which always
contain considerable quantities of raw human waste and often
contain hazardous toxic wastes which may leach into the
groundwater and/or provide breeding ground for rats, flies, and
mosquitoes.  Open burning of garbage (as opposed to properly
controlled incineration) exacerbates the air pollution problems
of most developing country cities.  Finally, many developingcountry cities allow uncontrolled dumping of garbage into nearby
rivers and other bodies of water, with obvious consequences for
public health.
The cost of solid waste disposal in developing country cities
usually accounts for a very large part of municipal budgets,
sometimes as high as 20-40%, with collection and transport
accounting for three-fourths of that cost -- disposal costs make
up the balance.  But the range in the level of costs is
tremendous, from $14 to $113 per metric ton of refuse collected
(Cointreau 1982: 24, 33).
Pricing
Pricing Theory
The provision of water, sewage, and solid waste management
services poses awkward choices for governments, given the
interconnected problems created by elements of economic
efficiency, natural monopoly, externalities, public services, and
merit services.  The conflicts can be seen from a list of
possible pricing goals:
Cost Recovery
The municipality should cover the full cost of the system's
operation, maintenance, depreciation, and interest on capital,
and perhaps even earn a surplus to help finance expansions that
extend or maintain coverage of its growing population.
Economic Efficiency
Prices should guide providers and consumers to that quantity of
output where the benefit of consuming the last unit of output
just equals the cost of providing the last unit of output.
Externality/Public Services
Clean drinking water and proper sanitation and waste disposal
services yield public health externalities enjoyed by the entire
population beyond just the private benefits, and prices should be
low enough to reap these external benefits.
Merit Services
Access to basic environmental services is a right of all citizens
and should not be denied to the poor.
Obviously, no single price can reconcile these various criteria.
And the usual, simple pricing formulas for public services
inevitably fail on several of the criteria, especially when the
service in question is a natural monopoly.  Consider several
possible pricing formulas:
1. Monopoly Pricing.  The provider could charge a monopoly price
(point A on figure 6) which would cover the full cost and yield a
profit that could be used to finance expansion [note 28].  This
price, however, brings about an inefficiently low level ofoutput, and it ignores both the externality and merit good
aspects.
2. Full Cost Pricing.  The price could be set to cover average
total cost (point B on figure 6).  This price covers the cost of
production, but it does not generate finance for expansion of the
system [note 29] and is inefficient in that output is too low --
some potential consumers who are willing to pay the marginal cost
of their consumption fail to receive the service.  This price
also ignores the externality and merit good aspects.
3. Marginal Cost Pricing.  This has several different meanings
[note 30]:
3a. Short-run marginal cost pricing without a capacity
constraint.  Where capacity is not reached over the relevant
market demand, setting price equal to short-run marginal cost
(point C on figure 6) is efficient in that all potential
consumers who are willing to cover the marginal cost of their own
consumption receive the service.  This price, however, fails to
cover the average total cost of production, much less to generate
a surplus for future expansion.  This price also fails to take
externalities into account, and it still might not be low enough
for the very poor.
3b. Short-run marginal cost pricing with a capacity constraint.
Once capacity is reached, the marginal cost of additional output
is essentially infinite.  Marginal cost pricing in this situation
simply means pricing to restrict demand to the capacity output
available.  In this case, short-run marginal cost pricing (point
D on figure 7) is both efficient and (if demand is high enough
relative to average total cost) capable of covering the full cost
and of generating finance for system expansion.  Ultimately, if
the demand were unchanging, it would be possible to find that
capacity at which a market-clearing price equaled
capacity-constrained short-run marginal cost and also equaled
average total cost.  At that point, the optimal capacity would
have been reached, short-run marginal cost pricing would be
correctly practiced, and revenues would cover the full cost.  Of
course, externality and merit good issues would still exist.
3c. Long-run marginal cost pricing.  Technically, this means
setting price equal to the cost of additional output when
capacity must be added, as if fixed capital could be added in
tiny increments [note 31].  In reality, however, investments in
fixed capital are lumpy, and so any realistic picture of the cost
of expanding output will exhibit steps, or discontinuities.   As
a city grows, water and sewage capacity must be enlarged
periodically in a series of discrete lumps ("e.g.", larger or
additional reservoirs, more or deeper wells, new treatment
plants).  "Long-run marginal cost pricing" has therefore come to
mean that each buyer of the service must reimburse the system for
the incremental capital cost (as well as the operating, or
variable, cost) of expanding capacity to accommodate future
users.  This additional capacity may incur the same short-run
marginal cost as the old capacity (in which case average total
cost will eventually approach the long-run marginal cost), or itmay incur higher costs [note 32].
4. "Lifeline" Pricing.  The price could be set low enough that
most, maybe almost all, of the poorest members of society can
afford the service (point E on figure 6).  This price may be
efficient, if the difference between the price and the marginal
cost at the attained output represents external benefits of the
service; even if the difference does not represent externalities,
the below-marginal-cost price may be justifiable on merit good
grounds.  This lifeline price, of course, fails to cover marginal
cost and hence requires a subsidy just for operation and
maintenance cost.  And needless to say, such pricing does not
begin to generate funds for expansion.
Finally, there is the question whether to meter or not.  On the
one hand, metering allows for more precise pricing, which makes
possible the achievement of efficiency and is necessary for
well-targeted subsidies.  On the other hand, meters -- and their
associated administrative activities -- add to cost.  Generally,
in the poorest cities, where there are few household connections
and piped-water usage is low, it makes sense to do without meters
for households and to charge a monthly rate, either a flat rate
or a rate graduated by property valuations.  As cities grow in
income, in number of piped-water connections, and in water usage,
metering gradually becomes a cost-effective option.
Figure 6. Natural Monopoly without a Capacity Constraint
Figure 7. Natural Monopoly with a Capacity Constraint
Pricing Practice
In practice, many developing country municipalities have:
1) set prices so low, even below marginal cost, that service
quality deteriorates;
2) not adjusted prices to keep up with inflation;
3) not collected fees regularly; and
4) not had a budget for expansion, even in areas where residents
are willing to pay the full cost of service.
Anderson describes the resulting ironies well:
"Physical infrastructure services are (or should be) inherently
low risk investments.  The technologies are well understood and
proven; demand growth rates are high; demand, revenues, and costs
can be projected with a reasonable degree of reliability; the
investments have long lifetimes given good maintenance; and the
authorities responsible for providing the services have the
advantages of being public monopolies.  As such, they should be
ideal investments for attracting domestic and foreign finance....However...infrastructure services have often proven to be high
risk investments in Africa, and have not attracted sufficient
private finance, domestic or foreign...undoubtedly one reason
lies in the common failure of the authorities to adopt
cost-reflecting pricing policies such that debts on commercial
terms could be serviced (Anderson 1989: 531)."
The agonizing sum of all these human-made problems is that
usually the poor are the ones deprived of basic services.  The
urban poorest are new migrants who typically live in new
neighborhoods.  If faulty pricing and budgeting techniques
prevent the expanded provision of basic services, they do
without, even if they are willing to pay out of their low
incomes.
Water Pricing
In practice, the pricing of piped water in most developing
country cities has failed to cover cost, is inefficient, and is
regressive.  The World Bank, 1992b, estimated that:
"...on average, households in developing countries pay only 35%
of the cost of supplying water....The proportion of total project
financing generated by utilities points in the same direction....
Internal cash generation accounts for only 8% of project cost in
Asia, 9% in sub-Saharan Africa, 21% in Latin America and the
Caribbean, and 35% in the Middle East and North Africa (:16,
104)."
Often, the intention is to cover most of the fixed cost out of
general funds, leaving water fees to cover recurrent cost.  If
cities could obtain sufficient general tax revenues without
serious distortions else-where in the economy, there would be
considerable logic to this structure of financing.  However, in
most developing countries, the general fund receipts simply have
not been sufficient.
In addition, if a city targets subsidies to the poor while
coverage is still incomplete, subsidized facilities may be taken
over by the better-off:
"If [urban infrastructure]...is in short supply, serviced
residential plots acquire a scarcity premium, and thus housing
becomes more expensive.  Serviced land prices may be further
elevated if, as is often the case in developing countries,
infrastructure fees are inadequate to cover capital and operating
cost, resulting in capitalization into land values some or all of
the shortfall in infrastructure fees (World Bank 1992a: 14)."
In this way, rising housing prices push the (renting) poor out,
and the subsidy benefits whoever owned the property at the time
of connection.  In Kenya, for example, subsidized sites and
services projects provided a windfall gain to the relatively
small number of households selected to participate -- those withconnections or luck.  Low-income beneficiaries quickly sold out
to middle-income home buyers, and took their cash with them to
less well-serviced neighborhoods.  In the end, serviced housing
sites intended for the poor were occupied by the middle class and
often owned by the wealthy.
The World Bank found that in the cities of Africa, Asia, and the
Caribbean where urban infrastructure and services have a high
rate of coverage and are priced and provided to be responsive to
demand, "The price of serviced land is only slightly higher than
the combined cost of raw land and infrastruc-ture installation"
(World Bank 1992a: 14).  In other cities, however, where urban
infrastructure is not provided to much of the population, the
ratio of the prices of serviced land to raw land is of the order
of ten or fifteen to one -- "far higher than consistent with the
cost of installing infrastructure" ("ibid.").
Most developing country cities simply cannot afford to extend
optimal (household) connections to the entire population.
Low-cost yard taps or neighborhood kiosks provide the poor with
affordable access to clean water.  Unfortunately, many developing
country governments have resisted less than the optimum.
Financing connections (and covering capital cost) is more of a
problem in developing country cities than in industrialized ones,
where almost all houses are connected to water and sewer lines by
law; connection fees for new housing are paid as a matter of
course.  In developing countries, many house-holds must wait
years to connect to city water (or sewage).  And the fee is
usually too high for a poor family to pay; in some cases, it is
higher than the connection cost (Linn 1983: 165).  Many cities
provide financing.  Sometimes this is financed with a separate
"mortgage" and sometimes by increasing the water rates for new
households [note 33].
Where municipalities have been expanding coverage, there has been
an additional pricing problem. Especially when the financing
comes from multilateral agencies, governments have required
utilities  to cover cost from revenue.  In these cases, new
beneficiaries are charged the full cost ("i.e.", the cost of
operation, maintenance, interest, and depreciation) for
connection to service, which is often financed by high monthly
service fees.  But households with established connections
continue to pay the same rates, often much lower, than that being
paid by the newly connected households (Meerman 1983: 508).  This
structure, is neither efficient nor does it recover cost.
Most utilities in developing countries either charge a flat rate
per month (for non-metered systems) or charge a flat rate per
unit of consumption (for metered systems).  In a recent study,
Garn, 1987, estimated that, while the unit cost of water averages
about $0.30 per cubic meter, revenues in developing country
utilities averaged only about $0.23 per cubic meter and had a
tendency to fall in real terms over time as inflation outpaced
price increases ("ibid.": 232).  Unfortunately, even these
loss-making pricing schemes tend to be regressive.  Wealthy
households can fill swimming pools for  a smaller fraction oftheir income than poor households pay for the bare minimum
amounts of water needed for drinking.
Instead of flat rates, some utilities charge complex rates --
"two-part tariffs" or "block rates" -- which are different (and
usually successively lower) prices on different units of
consumption.  If they are to conform to cost structures, such
rates include a high up-front fee to cover connection, metering,
and billing costs, and a low tariff for each unit delivered.
There are two problems with such a pricing system.  One, the
declining marginal prices are very regressive, with some of the
poor, who buy relatively little water, paying only at the high
initial prices.  Two, the high initial prices deter many other
poor households from even connecting up.
Alternatively, a "progressive block rate" charges a very low
amount for the first few units consumed (a "lifeline" tariff) and
higher rates for later units consumed [note 34].  This pricing
structure solves externality and merit good problems and can even
cover cost while cross-subsidizing the "lifeline" tariff [note
35].  However, it is not efficient [note 36].  More important, it
can still lead to inequities.  If the size of the "block" is kept
low, a moderately well-off, small household that requires little
water may pay less per unit than a poorer but much larger
household.  A more generously sized "block" may be too expensive
for the system to finance internally.
Whatever the tariff structure established by a utility, and even
if it was initially devised to cover recurrent cost, there has
been a problem with inflation running ahead of price increases,
eroding the ability of utilities to recover cost from revenue.
Given that wealthy households are most likely to receive urban
services, this inflation leads either to a subsidy for the
wealthy from general revenues, or to a deterioration in service
(or both).
Other problems frequently encountered include leakage,
unauthorized connections, and low collection rates.  There are
often failures in metering or billing systems.  Anderson, 1989,
notes that illegal connections may account for losses of 20% or
more of total output (: 528).  Water that is unaccounted for
(including leakage) constitutes some 40% of the piped-water
supply in Latin America (World Bank 1992b: 16, 109).  In many
countries, particularly in Africa, low collection rates have even
been exacerbated by non-paying government agencies and
parastatals.
Sewage Fees
Sewage fees have proven even harder to set than water fees
because it is difficult and not cost-effective to meter sewage
production from households.  Therefore, utilities usually assess
sewage fees in proportion to water usage (where water use is
metered), on the basis of estimates of the proportion of water
usage that enters the sewage system [note 37].  In places where
water is not metered, households are usually assessed a flat ratethat appears with the water bill.  In some cases, the fee may be
added to city taxes.  Sewage connection fees are usually financed
in the same way as water connections.  If not paid for in cash,
some cities offer long-term financing or an increased monthly
service charge that amortizes the investment.
Solid Waste Fees
Urban solid waste can be paid for in several different ways:
1) through the general fund, usually out of property taxes;
2) through a mandatory monthly fee to the municipality; or
3) through private operation and pricing.  In some cities,
residents are required by law to dispose of their garbage, and
private firms compete to provide this service.
More common is municipal collection or competitive bidding
between firms for an exclusive contract for the entire city (or
for sections of it).  However, left to their own devices, the
firms will take the "cream" of refuse  -- "i.e.", from households
that generate a high proportion of recyclables and from easily
accessible neighborhoods (Cointreau 1982: 25).  Therefore, if a
municipality decides to contract the bulk of collection to firms,
it must handle the rest or subsidize private collection from
poorer sections.
Landfill site owners usually charge the dumper a "tipping fee."
If the municipality owns a site, it can dump its garbage there at
no cost and charge other users a tipping fee.  But if, it does
not own, it will be charged a tipping fee.
Can these costs be recovered?  A sensible pricing structure for
wealthy or well-organized municipalities may involve charging a
user fee to the beneficiary households.  However, reliance on
user charges may drive poor households to dispose of their
garbage illegally and unsafely.  Similarly, user charges do not
yet appear to deter waste generation (Cointreau 1982: 41).
Furthermore, separate charges for each household are expensive to
administer, monitor, and collect.
Ultimately, devising a workable, efficient structure of the
availability and prices of urban environmental services depends
on knowledge of what households are willing to pay for what
different kinds of service at what costs.
VALUING URBAN ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
Constructing an efficient supply and fee structure for water,
sewage, and solid waste disposal services depends on estimates oftheir economic value that are not easy to make.  Markets do not
provide good estimates of consumers' willingness to pay nor of
benefits from externalities.
In the past, many municipalities in developing countries have
assumed that their residents' willingness to pay for such
services was low.  So they did not set prices high enough to
cover costs, and utilities were unable to finance maintenance and
expansion.  In fact, the evidence speaks of a high willingness to
pay.  For water and sewage, for example, which have had the
greatest number of studies, there is now consensus on three key
points:
1. Most residents can pay the full cost of in-house water
connections (although probably not sewer connections).
2. It is almost always feasible to raise the cost of water for
most households to a point slightly above the full cost to
finance expansion from revenues and provide some service to the
poorest households.
3. Even in the poorest cities, it is economical to provide
universal access to city water and even to subsidize water and
sanitation for the poorest households (with yard taps or densely-
spaced neighborhood kiosks), on the basis of external, public
health benefits.
There are two sources of economic value for environmental
services:
1) private willingness to pay for the service; and
2) external benefits from the service.
Willingness to Pay
Many different techniques have been used to derive estimates of
willingness to pay.  This paper now looks at briefly at seven.
Revealed Preference Techniques
"Revealed preference" simply means that information about
willingness to pay can be inferred from the amounts households
actually pay.  In Onitsha (Nigeria), a city of about 700,000,
only about 10% of the households are connected to the city water
corporation (Whittington "et al." 1991b).  There are a score of
private, independent boreholes in and around the city, which
provide water to many privately owned large tanker trucks.  These
trucks sell most of their water to businesses or wealthy
households who have large storage tanks, many of whom have become
"small retail water vendors" ("ibid.": 181).  These vendors then
sell water both to individuals, who come with buckets for their
own use, and to "distributing vendors," who carry water from theretail vendors to households.  Most households are within 50
meters of a retail vendor.  This private system distributes about
13,000 cubic meters per day during the dry season.  The city
corporation distributes another 6,800 cubic meters.  Finally, in
a few parts of the city, households can get water free from
shallow wells by the sidewalks (about 1,400 cubic meters).
Water prices in Onitsha vary tremendously [note 38].  Individuals
pay about $50 per kiloliter for water from retail vendors and up
to $130 per kiloliter for water from distributing vendors.
Those who buy water directly from tankers pay about $15 per
kiloliter if they buy over 1,000 gallons (4.5 cubic meters) or
$40 per kiloliter if they fill only a 200 liter drum.  The
tankers, in turn, pay only about $3-4 per kiloliter at the
boreholes, and the city corporation only manages to collect $3
per kiloliter on average.
This wide range of prices reveals a wide range of marginal
willingness to pay.  Moreover, since the poorest end up paying
the highest prices, the study indicates a high willingness to pay
for water by the poor.
There are fewer studies of demand for sewage systems than for
water systems.  One very detailed study (Whittington "et al."
1991a) conducted in Kumasi (Ghana) revealed a wide variety of
systems in use and willingness to pay.  Current sanitation
systems in Kumasi include flush toilets connected to septic tanks
(usually shared by all households in an apartment building),
private bucket latrines (usually also shared), and public
latrines.  Most of the public latrines are bucket latrines or
aqua privies [note 39].  Some new ventilated, improved pit
latrines (VIPs) are in use, both as public and private latrines
[note 40].  A small proportion of the population uses simple pit
latrines (or "the bush"); only a few buildings -- the hospital,
the university, and some government buildings -- are connected to
a sewage system.  The study team surveyed usage of the public
latrines:
-- About one-fourth of the families use toilets connected to
septic tanks; these households pay an average of $0.02 per capita
per month for the desludging of septic tanks [note 41].
-- Another one-fourth of the households use bucket latrines; they
pay an average of $0.11 per month per capita to have the buckets
emptied a few times a week.
-- Nearly half the people use public latrines, and spend an
average of $0.25 per capita per month [note 42].
These figures can be compared to what the average Kumasi family
pays for rent ($1.50 per month for a one-room apartment), for
electricity ($1.63 per month), and for water ($1.13 per month),
out of an average income of $15 per capita per month.
Contingent Valuation Techniques"Contingent" valuation means the values people place on
hypothetical services not currently offered.  Obviously, such
information is counterfactual.  Whittington "et al.", 1991b,
surveyed households in Kumasi (Ghana), asking respondents: "Would
you be willing to pay x amount per drum of water if you could get
a household connection?"  The surveyors varied the amount until
they had determined a narrow band of prices for each household
[note 43].  The study found that 86% of respondents were willing
to pay $6 per kiloliter to be connected to city water; 60%, $10.
At the $10 price, the city water corporation would maximize its
total revenues [note 44].  These prices are much lower than most
households are now paying for private water but at least twice as
high as the city corporation now collects and substantially
higher than the prices being discussed between the corporation
and the World Bank (about $4-5 per kiloliter).
The World Bank project planned ultimately to serve 80% of the
city's population through direct household connections.
Whittington "et al.", 1991b, calculated that households using the
private vending system in Onitsha were paying $7 million per
year, while the annual operation and maintenance cost of the new
system would be $3.3 million, and total annual costs, including
capital recovery ("i.e.", interest and depreciation) would be $10
million.  However, the household survey results suggest that the
city water corporation would have to increase its reliability and
water quality to entice such a large proportion of the population
to pay.  Further, it would have to improve its billing and
collection to recover costs.
Unfortunately, the Whittington team did not report any detail on
the relationship between willingness to pay (whether based on
current expenditure or on survey responses) and household income
[note 45].  The rich consume more water, but it is not known to
what extent that extra consumption is due to the fact that they
pay a lower price per unit and to what extent to their higher
income.  Useful estimates of total willingness to pay must make
this distinction.
In addition, it is curious that households were unwilling to pay
as much for city-provided, piped, running water as for private,
vended water in containers.  The most likely reason is the city
water utility's reputation for unreliability.  If householders
believed that city service was unlikely to improve, they would
feel they had to keep their tanks and vendors.  Thus they would
probably not be willing to pay as much for unreliable public
service (requiring backups) as for their established system.
Another possibility -- that always haunts the contingent
valuation method -- is that interviewees were responding
strategically: If they believed that their responses would not
affect the availability of water  but would be used by the city
to set prices, they would tend to understate their willingness to
pay.  However, "strategic" responses may run the other way, too.
If they believed their responses would affect their availability
of water but would not affect prices, they would tend to
overstate their willingness to pay.Whittington "et al.", 1991a, also surveyed Kumasi (Ghana)
households about their satisfaction with their current sanitation
systems, about their interest in either a toilet with a sewage
connection or in a ventilated pit latrine (VIP), and about their
willingness to pay for either.  Most households with private
(apartment-shared) sanitation systems were generally satisfied;
but there was considerable dissatisfaction with the public
latrines -- which were considered lacking in privacy and
convenience [note 46].  Without taking cost into account, the
households showed roughly equal interest in toilets and VIPs.
Those who preferred the toilets perceived them as cleaner; those
who preferred the VIPs perceived them as simpler and more
reliable (in part because there is irregularity in the city's
water supply).
The survey also included direct questions on willingness to pay
for WCs ("i.e.", toilets) and VIPs with the following results:
"Households without a WC on average said that they were willing
to pay about the same amount per month for a WC as for a...VIP
($1.43 vs. $1.47).  Households with a WC said they were willing
to pay slightly less than this for a connection to a sewer
($1.32).  On average, households without water connections said
that they were willing to pay $1.56 for a...VIP and $2.53 per
month for both a water connection and a WC (Whittington "et al."
1991a: 121).
Hedonic Pricing Techniques
"Hedonic" pricing econometrically estimates the value of specific
individual attributes of a good that is sold only as a bundle of
these attributes.  This technique has been used most extensively
to break housing prices down into values of square meters of
floor space, number of bathrooms, quality of the air, degree of
police security, "etc."  Access to, or quality of, water, sewage,
and solid waste service are also attributes of a house.  Where it
is difficult to estimate the contribution to a house's price of
its various "bundled" attributes, regressions across a large
sample can yield regression-coefficient estimates of these
implicit prices (and hence "market" values).
Kaufmann and Quigley, 1987, examined housing conditions, housing
prices (rent or mortgage), and in-kind (primarily labor)
contributions to a housing development project for low-income
families in Santa Anna (El Salvador).  The study examined a
sample of poor families who participated in a "sites and
services" project and a matched sample who were not project
participants.
The study included a very detailed survey of housing conditions
and amenities.  For example, water service is described by means
of five binary variables and four continuous variables.  The
binary variables indicate whether or not basic types of service
are provided: private piped water, public piped water, water
purchased from vendors, water carried from streams or wells, andwell water.   Three continuous variables measure the number of
hours per day water is available for the first three types of
service.  A final continuous variable measures the distance water
must be carried.  Analogously, the information describing
sanitary services consists of four binary variables and two
continuous measures.
Total housing expenditure is written as a function of a vector of
the housing attributes.  This equation is known as a "hedonic
price function" and is estimated econometrically.  Then, partial
differentiation of the function with respect, in turn, to each
variable yields the marginal price of each attribute.  Estimates
of the hedonic price function, combined with estimates of
household income and expenditure and estimates of the private
costs imposed on program participants (usually self-help labor),
provide estimates of demand for the various housing attributes
(including water and sewage service) as a function of the
attribute's implicit price and the household income.
Kaufmann and Quigley's analysis includes an index of water
service ranging from 0 (very poor -- presumably no access to safe
water and a considerable distance to unsafe water) to 3 (very
good -- presumably an in-house water connection and a reliable
supply of safe water).  The analysis estimates that a unit
increase in the index of water quality ("e.g.", from 1 to 2) is
worth an extra $2 per month in rent or mortgage payments to the
average low-income household (Kaufmann and Quigley 1987: 272).
Note that this value is placed on improved access to water alone
("e.g.", running water in the house vs.  a hand pump down the
street or perhaps a shallow well in the yard) as a housing
attribute; it does not include the cost of the water itself.
Similarly, the index of sanitary service ranged from 0 (very poor
-- presumably reliance on the bush) to 10 (very good --
presumably a flush toilet with a reliable sewage connection).
This larger range  reflects more options than for water service.
The value of a unit increase in service to an average house is
estimated at about $0.50 per month.  Again, this measures only
improved service.
Unfortunately, the study's use of indices precludes valuation of
specific amenities.  Yet it concludes that the direct benefits of
sites-and-services projects (not limited to improved water and
sewage service) significantly outweighed costs.
Opportunity Cost-of-Time Techniques
This fourth measure focuses on the time spent fetching water and
the value of that time were it to become available for other
activities.  In most developing countries, households without
running water (or at least a large storage tank) must send
members (usually women) to gather water.  A large urban household
may need two or more trips per day, involving both walking and
waiting time.
Many studies have simply assumed that the value of such time issubstantially less than that of unskilled labor, usually on the
basis of time valuation from transport studies.  But passengers
in transit, or waiting, can read, sell, knit, sew, or study --
things people going for water cannot do.  Whittington "et al.",
1990, determined that households value time spent gathering water
at approxi-mately the going wage rate.
Whittington's team studied household water source decisions in
the town of Ukundu (Kenya), where the vast majority of households
not connected to city water can choose several private sources:
vendors who deliver water, kiosks that sell water, and open
wells.  The differences in water quality are not great, so the
household's choice of water source depends primarily on price and
collection time.  Well water is free, but involves the highest
collection time for most households (10 to 25 minutes).  Water
from the kiosk is sold at a fixed price of $0.50 per kiloliter
($0.01 for a 20 liter container), and usually requires 5-15
minutes.  Water from vendors costs $5 per kiloliter ($0.10 for
a 20 liter container) but requires no household time.  Household
decisions on where to obtain water thus yield upper and/or lower
bounds on the value of their time.
The market wage rate for unskilled labor in the area is about
$0.25 per hour.  Of the households in the study, 62% chose a
kiosk.  On average, these households value their time (estimated
as the mean of the midpoints between upper and lower bounds on
time valuation) higher than the market wage rate, namely, at
$0.38 per hour.  Twenty-five percent of the households chose
water vendors.  The lower bound of the value of time is at $0.57
per hour -- more than twice the minimum wage.  Thirteen percent
use open wells; but for over half of these, a kiosk is further
away than a well.  The upper bound for the remaining few
households is about $0.37 per hour {note 47].
As expected, there is a distinct correlation between household
income and choice of water source.  Households choosing a vendor
have an average annual income of $2,000; a kiosk, $1,250.  And
households with fewer adult women are more likely to choose a
vendor.  The study econometrically estimates that -- for an
average household, holding income, other demographic
characteristics, and prices constant --  the value of time spent
hauling water is about $0.31 per hour, one-fourth higher than the
market wage rate.
Thus, families getting their water from kiosks pay $0.50 per
kiloliter of water, and, if they value their time at $0.38 per
hour and spend ten minutes per trip gathering 20 liters at a
time, the opportunity cost of their time and effort adds almost
$3.20 per kiloliter -- more than six times the cash price of the
water.
Techniques for Calculating Costs of Averting and Treating Disease
Families without access to basic environmental services can
sometimes avert the worst effects of this lack by private
expenditures.  For example, if people lack publicly-provided safedrinking water, they must boil water to reduce their
vulnerability to disease.  But this extremely expensive recourse
costs, for example, about 11% of the income of the lowest
quartile of the population in Bangladesh, and almost 30% of the
income of a squatter family in Peru (World Bank 1992b: 100).
Chemical treatment is even more expensive.
The costs of disease treatment are more straightforwardly
apparent, once the relationship between services and disease have
been established; they include the opportunity cost of the time
of health-care workers as well as the costs of drugs, equipment,
hospital space, "etc."
Techniques for Calculating Lost Output from Morbidity and
Mortality
The valuation of the opportunity cost of foregone production
resulting from sickness or premature death usually makes use of
the "human capital" approach, which considers the present
discounted value of the lost income of the victim.  For morbidity
("i.e.", an illness of specific duration), this is conceptually
straightforward, although it can be difficult to estimate.
Valuing a change in mortality, or risk of mortality, is much more
problematic --  how does one value life?  Some studies use as a
lower bound the present discounted value of the income of an
individual's expected remaining working life [note 48].  Other
studies use hedonic estimates of the difference in wages for
occupations with different risks of death (for instance, a mine
worker must be paid more than a factory assembly-line worker to
compensate for the added risk of accidental death or injury).
Some studies use contingent valuation, and simply ask
respondents: "How much would you demand in compensation for a one
in 100,000 increase in the risk of death?"  However, there seems
to be a big difference between perceived voluntary risks ("e.g.",
smoking cigarettes or working in a mine) and involuntary ones
(e.g., a nuclear power plant built near one's house).  There is
also a distinction between sudden, accidental death, and death
occurring after a long illness (Cropper and Oates 1991: 714).
Most of these studies, which have been undertaken in the
developed world, where productivity and incomes are much higher
than in developing countries [note 49], estimate a higher value
of life for the wealthy than for the poor.  Most economists
escape the dilemma of this morally repugnant differential by
describing such estimates of the value of a "statistical life" as
lower bound estimates (Cropper and Oases 1992: 713).
Techniques to Account for Pain and Suffering
Many studies of the costs of pollution and disease go beyond
averting and treatment expenditures and values of foregone
outputs and attempt to add a value for individual willingness to
pay for a specific improvement in health [note 50].  Such studies
are, clearly, fraught with practical and ethical difficulties.The subject of willingness to pay for municipal environmental
services has two final complications.  First, one often finds a
vicious cycle of low reliability of water supplies and low
willingness to pay  for them.  This can lead to misleading
estimates of willingness to pay for reliable service.  Many
studies show that households are willing to pay much more for
reliable service.  A study in the Punjab, Pakistan, revealed that
connections increased dramatically when reliability improved so
did revenue (World Bank 1992b: 105).
Second, matching willingness to pay with the right kind of
service can be a problem.  In a poor region of Thailand, a water
project installed neighborhood hand pumps with access to safe
groundwater (World Bank 1992b: 106).  After five years, most of
the pumps had broken due to lack of maintenance; others were
disused.  A follow-up project installed motorized pumps for
neighborhood standpipes.  Five years later, the majority of pumps
had broken down, and most others functioned only intermittently.
The community seemed unwilling to pay for the operation and
maintenance cost of these systems and resorted to hauling buckets
to and from traditional wells.  However, because many households
expressed an interest in individual yard taps, the project began
to allow them to buy yard taps with meters.  Five years later,
80% of the population had opted for yard taps, 90% of which were
functioning reliably.  Thus most of the community were willing to
pay for a higher level of service than project designers had
supposed.
Another study, however, found the exact converse (Romm 1987).  A
community in Bolivia was offered only patio connections, with no
possibility of cheaper yard or neighborhood taps.  Many
households refused (or were unable) to pay, and the project
suffered financial losses.
The difference in outcomes suggests that if only kiosks are
offered, they will be considered inadequate by households as
their incomes rise ("i.e.", the Thailand problem) yet if only
household connections are offered, the currently poor households
will not be able to afford them ("i.e.", the Bolivia problem).
Accordingly, water projects should be flexibility designed for
level of service (and prices), to ensure that households can
upgrade as when they can afford to.
In summary, these studies show a high willingness to pay.  The
World Bank, 1992b, has concluded that the "vast majority of urban
residents...are willing to pay the full cost" (: 16) of their
water supplies.  Ringskog, 1987, cites one persistent myth that
is hampering progress: "the belief that consumers cannot afford
to pay the higher tariffs which it would take to make the sector
financially autonomous" (: 225).
External BenefitsCities in developing countries must consider, in addition a
household's willingness to pay for environmental services, any
external benefits of such services for other households.  These
external benefits fall into three categories:
1) public health benefits (a large portion is the benefit counted
under private willingness to pay);
2) benefits of reduced pollution; and
3) benefits of reduced direct damage to a community's welfare.
Such external benefits are gained because one household's
decision to utilize clean water, sanitation, or proper waste
disposal services will also benefit its neighbors.  Yet rational,
self-interested households will not fully consider these benefits
when deciding to pay for services.  These benefits are "public
services" in two senses:
1) the neighbors cannot easily be excluded from them even if they
do not contribute to the cost of providing them ("i.e.",
non-excludability); and
2) socially, there is no reason to exclude the neighbors from
them since their enjoyment uses up no resources that could be
used elsewhere ("i.e.", non-rivalness).
Since these benefits are "external," the market provides no data
on their economic value Cropper and Oases, 1992, describe the
steps required to value the benefits of reducing pollution:
(1) the emissions reduction...must be related to changes in
ambient air or water quality;
(2) the change in ambient environmental quality must be related
to health or other outcomes through a dose-response function;
[and]
(3) the health or nonhealth outcomes must be valued (: 722).
The first two steps are difficult enough, requiring large amounts
of data and sophisticated analysis.  The third step, particularly
for public health, is even more daunting, being fraught with such
imponderables as the appropriate compensation for pain and
suffering and, indeed, the very value of life itself.
Public Health Externalities
Although it is impossible to value external public health
benefits with any precision, there is abundant evidence that they
can be very large.  After installation of water and sewage
systems in Western cities, life expectancy shot up from the low
30s to almost 50 years [note 51].  The lost income in Peru during
the first 10 weeks of its cholera epidemic -- measured as
foregone earnings from agriculture, fisheries, and tourism --
was three times the nation's investment in water and sanitationinfrastructure for the previous 10 years (World Bank 1992b: 100).
The World Bank estimates that well over 1 billion episodes of
diarrheal and water-born parasitic diseases result each year from
unclean water, and that diarrhea alone causes the death of about
3 million people per year.  If poor people had access to safe
water and adequate sanitation, annually there would be 2 million
fewer deaths from diarrhea among children under five years of
age, 200 million fewer episodes of diarrheal illness, 300 million
fewer with roundworm infection, 150 million fewer with
schistosomiasis, and 2 million fewer with guinea worm (World Bank
1992b: 49).
Public health benefits must be ascertained before they can be
valued.  It is, however, not enough to simply look at
before-and-after data for cities making various improvements in
environmental services.  Experts have shown it is not valid to
ascribe too many health benefits to the provision of clean water
and sanitation service alone.  Their provision usually coincides
with other improvements in health infrastructure --  health care,
housing, education, and nutrition (Koenigsberger "et al." 1971:
30-34).  To separate the different sources of improvement would
require a very careful study.  Data are not available on whether
the emphasis should be on quantity of water or quality of water,
nor on the relationship between the type of sewage system and the
incidence of any disease, nor even on what type of benefits can
be ascribed to solid waste removal.  Even after public health
benefits are ascertained, valuing them is difficult.  Such
valuation can be built up from a number of often overlapping
sources similar to those discussed under revealed preference
techniques.
But to estimate these external benefits, private valuations must
be separated from external or public valuations.  Consider a
household without access to safe water.  If the household boils
its water to avoid illness, this incurs a private cost;
similarly, if it fails to boil its water, contracts illness, and
incurs medical costs and loss of income, these are still private
costs.  However, if its neighbors lack access to clean water, get
sick, and somehow pass the illness to them, the resulting cost is
"external" and would not be captured by any assessment of private
costs.  Thus, some of the value of the benefits is not captured
in the value of private willingness to pay [note 52].
Production Externalities
Many of the measurable external economic costs of poor sanitation
are those imposed on providers -- for instance, raw sewage and
solid waste dumped into rivers kill fish and other marine life
and adversely affect the outputs and incomes of fishers.  This is
conceptually straightforward but very difficult to measure.
Consider the cholera epidemic in Peru.  There was a huge loss in
revenue from fishing -- many people stopped buying fish for fear
of contamination and fishermen were too sick to work.  There are,
however, two problems with using this gross output loss to
measure the potential benefit of change:1) the total loss in revenue grossly overstates the net loss to
the economy -- when-ever fishing boats do not work, there are
savings in fuel and other production costs; and
2) gross out-put and revenue might not fall because fishers
compensate for their changed circumstances, devoting more
resources (more time spent out fishing, more fuel, bigger nets)
to production.  The costs of pollution should be measured by the
value of the extra inputs, rather than by any loss of output.
Recreational and Aesthetic Externalities
This final category of external benefits is perhaps the most
difficult to value.  Suffice it to say that there are
externalities involved, because people are not only willing to
pay to have their own garbage removed and their own septic tanks
maintained -- they want their neighbors' garbage removed and
their neighbors' septic tanks maintained as well.  This shows up
in the willingness of families to pay more to live in a
neighborhood that doesn't have garbage lying around and that
doesn't smell like an open sewer.  These aspects of willingness
to pay need also, in principle at least, to be added in.
An important thread runs through this analysis of the economic
valuation of basic urban environmental services.   People, even
poor people, are very willing to pay.  But an economic valuation
of this individual willingness to pay must be added to, for two
reasons.  First, since the amenities are not usually sold
directly through well-functioning markets, non-market methods of
estimating willingness to pay must be examined.  In the process,
it is more likely that willingness to pay will be under- rather
than over-valued.  Second, a variety of external benefits is
involved, which impinge on a possibly large number of people in
multifarious ways.  Actual valuation of these benefits will
almost certainly miss many of them.
APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGIES
There is generally high private demand for urban amenities, and
social ("i.e.", externality) considerations urge their provision
even more.  Yet there is nevertheless a great diversity in
willingness to pay among urban residents of different incomes,
which suggests a need for flexibility in providing different
levels and qualities of service.
In developing country cities, low-cost technologies can help give
this flexibility, especially in providing services to the poor.
Clearly, given the financial constraints that most developing
countries face:"...there will be little expansion of service in the 1990s unless
sector professionals learn how to incorporate more realistic
estimates of effective demand into investment plans and service
level choices (Institution of Civil Engineers 1990: 3)."
Appropriate technologies are, however, only one imperative.  In
the past decade, the international efforts to increase the
coverage of water supply and sanitation for urban residents in
developing countries have taught the importance of encouraging
community participation; building local institutions to train
personnel to construct, manage, operate, and maintain service
systems; and educating the public about of a healthy urban
environment.  Most important, technologies must also
be appropriate both culturally and institutionally.
In the past decade, civil engineers have developed a wide array
of low-cost technologies to provide services while innovatively
using local institutional and cultural inputs.  These
technologies, which prove that "quantum leaps" are not necessary
to build a healthy urban environment, probably hold the key to
sustainable service expansion.
Water Supply and Sanitation
A wide spectrum of technologies is available for the provision of
potable water and hygienic sanitation services, ranging from
full-scale and centralized piped-water and sewage systems with
mostly individual house connections to hand pumps and dry or
waterborne on-site sewers.  The choice of technology to a large
extent determines the cost of the services.
Conventional service systems in the urban areas of developing
countries involve city-wide service planning.  Cities typically
provide households with individual house connections for piped
water and sewage.  Although these full-scale technologies,
adopted from industrialized countries, are routinely constructed
and have proven most beneficial to residents, they are very
costly (see table 5).
Full-scale technologies are especially costly in the case of
sanitation (see table 6).  These conventional systems can
frequently be prohibitively expensive as the result of high
design and service standards.
Costs of service facilities can often be reduced by scaling down
the design of these conventional systems and using simpler
standards.  A survey of World Bank sites-and-services projects
carried out in 1974 showed that the use of communal standpipes
for water supply, instead of individual plot connections, reduced
average costs from $80 to $30-50 per connection (Linn 1983: 149).
Often, cost reductions can be achieved by emphasizing quantity of
water rather than quality:"In the last two decades...an increasing amount of evidence has
accumulated for the impor-tance of access to water in adequate
quantities as a means of improving health...water quantity
appears to be more important than water quality...(Cairncross
1990: 111)."
Low-cost options for water supply may be constrained by the
availability of uncontaminated ground-water.  However, low-cost
technologies -- such as hand pumps -- can also be used in urban
settings.  In Epworth (Zimbabwe), locally produced hand pumps
supply potable water to 30,000 people who used to rely on
contaminated open wells (Morgan 1987: 57).  The cost of
installation is less than $20 per head.  According to a World
Bank assessment, "In the areas where groundwater is readily
avail-able at moderate depth, constructing a number of wells
fitted with hand pumps is by far the cheapest means of providing
a good water supply" (McJunkin and Hofkes 1982: 37).
Indeed, many developing countries have taken an innovative
approach in scaling down the conven-tional service systems to
achieve economies.  In Cochabamba (Bolivia) new design criteria
reduce the needed sewer diameters, slopes, and manholes.  By also
integrating waste treatment with irrigation, the service reaches
conventional quality standards at greatly reduced cost (Bartone
1990c: 9).  The same principle is also applied in Brazil, where
simplified sewage was developed that allows smaller, shallower,
flatter sewers with fewer manholes.  In combination with
low-volume flush toilets (using only one-third the water per
flush as conventional toilets), this system reduces costs by as
much as 33-46% while providing the same level of service as
conventional sewage (World Bank 1992b: 108; Bartone 1990c: 9).
In Natal (South Africa), simplified sewage in squatter
settlements resulted in an unprecedented connection rate of 97%
and full-cost recovery through a 40% surcharge on water bills.
To accomplish the same result, a conventional system would have
required a surcharge of 100% on a much higher water bill and
government subsidies (Bernstein 1992: 75).  In Karachi
(Pakistan), simplified sewage provides service to the poor.  With
extensive community participation in construction and financing,
the cost reductions can be dramatic, from $1,000 per household
for sanitation facilities to less than $50 in the Orangi Pilot
Project.  As a result, "600,000 people in Orangi are now served
with self-financed sewers" (World Bank 1992b: 108).
There have also been innovative adaptations of conventional
sewage to the constraints of developing  countries' budgets.
Small-bore sewers are used in combination with septic tanks or
interceptor tanks to convey solid-free sewage.  The cost of such
a hybrid sewage system, without diminishing service, is often
only half of that for the conventional system (Bartone 1990c: 9;
World Bank 1992b: 108).  In Brazil, a new sewage design, called
"condominial," features a shorter grid of smaller and shallower
sewers as feeders to the main system.  Costs are reduced 20-30%
from those for a conventional system (World Bank 1992b: 107).
Cost savings are the largest if decentralized on-site sanitation
can be used.  This type of low-cost system is most suitable tourban areas with low population density, well-drained soil, and
low water consumption rates.  Two systems have been widely
adopted in developing countries over the past decade:
1) pour-flush toilets, first developed in India; and
2) the ventilated improved pit (VIP) latrine, first developed in
Zimbabwe.
The pour-flush toilet is a waterborne, on-site sanitation system.
By using hand-poured water to flush the toilet, a water seal is
provided between the household and the excreta storage pit, so
that odors, flies, and insects are kept out of the latrine
enclosure (McGarry 1982b: 150).  The system also suits the local
customs of many developing countries, where water is used for
anal cleaning.  The construction cost is only about $100 per
private latrine.  This system has enjoyed great success in India
since its introduction in 1970s.  In Delhi, for instance, public
systems expanded quickly, supported by government subsidies, by
appropriate user fees, and by community involvement.  By November
1990, 68 complexes have been put in place, patronized by 290,000
men and women daily, and another 61 are in the process of
completion (Bernstein 1992: 77).
Nineteen other countries throughout South Asia, Africa, and Latin
America have adopted a slightly modified system with significant
cost advantages.  In Jakarta (Indonesia), for instance, the total
investment cost for a pour-flush system is only one-fourth that
of conventional off-site sewage, while operation and maintenance
costs are also lower (De Kruijff 1987: 53).
VIP latrines are designed to reduce the problems of smell and
flies typical of conventional pit latrines.  The technology is
sufficiently simple and in tune with customs of many developing
countries to allow wide community participation.  Community
self-help labor greatly reduces the financial costs of the
system.  A study on sanitation in Kumasi (Ghana) indicates that a
VIP system can significantly reduce the costs of sanitation in
comparison with the conventional sewered water closets
(Whittington "et al." 1991a: 124).  The system has also been
demonstrated in the slums of Guayaquil (Ecuador), where sewers
are not economically and technologically feasible (Bartone 1990c:
10).
In Mozambique, the improvement in sanitation is achieved by
upgrading traditional "bush" latrines ("i.e.", a fenced-off
corner on the plot with a pit covered with poles, scrap material,
and soil).  The introduction of composting and VIP latrines,
though relatively low-cost, turned out to be unsuccessful because
people do not like the idea of emptying latrines and defecating
in a roofed house, and construction materials are not all
available locally.  As a result, engineers developed an
innovative design to upgrade traditional latrines by means of a
safe and hygienic latrine slab.  Families can simply dig a pit
and put the slab on.  The slab can be manufactured with local
materials and costs less than $10.  The household response to theinnovative design has been tremendous.  Thirty thousand slabs
were quickly sold in Maputo alone, and half a dozen other urban
centers in Mozambique also adopted the design (Brandberg 1987:
529).
Table 5. Unit Costs of Construction
----------------------------------------------------------------
                       (median values of national averages)
                    Urban Water Supply       Urban Sanitation
Region              H.C.          S.P.       S.C.       Other
Africa              $100            $4       $150         $53
South America        125            62        165          62
Southeast Asia        55             4         63          15
Europe               100            77        150          50
East Mediterranean   250           102        530         365
West Pacific          80            20        220          50
----------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
  1. H.C. = house connection.
  2. S.P. = stand-post.
  3. S.C. = sewer connection.
  4. Figures are dollars per capita, 1980.
  Source: WHO 1984: 32.
Table 6. Cost and Affordability of Alternative Sanitation
Techniques
----------------------------------------------------------------
Technology          Mean Annual Cost         Percent of Income of
                     [note 2]                Average Poor
                    (1978 $)                 Household [note 2]
Low Cost [note 1]--
  Pour-flush toilet              $19                           2%
  Pit latrine                     28                           3
  Communal toilet                 34                           9
  Vacuum-truck cartage [note 3]   38                           4
  Low-cost septic tank [note 3]   52                           6
  Composting toilet               55                          10
  Bucket cartage                  65                           6
Medium Cost [note 1]--
  Sewered aqua privy [note 3]    159                          11
  Aqua privy                     168                          16
  Japanese vacuum-truck cart     188                          15
High Cost [note 1] --
  Septic tank [note 3            369                          29
  Sewage [note 3]                400                          26
----------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
  1. Costs include appropriate shadow prices for unskilled labor,
     foreign exchange, and capital.
  2. Assuming average annual per capita income of $180 and six
     persons per household.  3. Suitable for urban areas.
Source: Linn 1983: 151.
Solid Waste Collection and Disposal
In developing countries, labor is less expensive relative to
capital than in the industrialized countries.  Hence, low-cost
provision of municipal solid waste services usually involves the
use of labor-intensive technology.  Reduction in costs requires
the judicious choice of solid waste collection and disposal
equipment -- units that are designed to suit local geographical
characteristics, waste composition, and labor availability.  This
frequently means that instead of full-scale collection trucks,
mechanized compactor vehicles, and street sweepers, small trucks
and hand-pulled or animal-drawn carts may be appropriate, except
in the largest metropolitan centers.
There is ample evidence that government agencies can provide
solid waste services efficiently.  For example, the Shanghai
(China) municipal government runs a profitable network of
recovery stations and waste utilization plants (Cointreau 1987:
43-55).  However, private participation can often reduce costs.
Private participation through contracting, franchising,
competitive bidding, and equipment leasing can sometimes greatly
lower costs.  In Bangkok (Thailand), contracted municipal solid
waste management service appears to have lowered costs.  In Seoul
(Korea), Jakarta (Indonesia), and Bogota (Colombia), private
collections command a substantial cost advantage in labor, wages,
and benefits (Cointreau-Levine 1991: 3, 15).  In Kuala Lumpur
(Malaysia), private firms make more trips per vehicle per day and
collect more waste on each trip, and hence are nearly 50% more
productive than the public service ("ibid.": 17).  Evidence from
Latin American cities also points to lower costs and higher
productivity for the private sector (Bartone "et al." 1991).
This does not imply, however, that privatization is a panacea for
the general inadequacy of solid waste service in developing
countries, especially in serving the urban poor.  Not only are
the poor least able to support waste collection with their own
tax base or user fees, they also generate the least valuable
garbage and the highest collection cost for private providers.
The low-cost solution there calls for creative service provision
and extensive mobilization of community members to clean up their
own neighborhoods.  In the slums of Curitiba (Brazil), which
cannot be reached by collection trucks, the municipal government
motivates people to dispose of their garbage by exchanging food
for bags of garbage.  The food is drawn from the state's
agricultural surplus (Brooke 1992: A4).  In Indonesia:
"...cities commonly work with the local leader of low-income
neighborhoods to organize community efforts for self-delivery of
waste to a communal depot or to hire and manage the
neighborhood's workers who provide door-to-door collection bypush cart (Cointreau-Levine 1991: 20)."
Many cities in China also rely on community leaders to organize
neighborhood cleanups.
Many developing countries have a long tradition of the informal
sector participating in the collection and recycling of municipal
waste.  Armies of scavengers work daily on the streets and in the
landfills for recyclable refuse.  In Manila (Philippines), about
20,000 people live around a dump known as "Smokey Mountain."  A
few thousand scavengers live in Bangkok (Thailand)
(Cointreau-Levine 1991: 90).  In Cairo (Egypt), nearly 4,000
scavengers, known as wahis and zabbaleen, haul over 50% of
collected municipal refuse with their donkey carts (Cointreau
1987: 22 and Neamatalla "et al." 1985: 20).  Low-cost waste
collection often calls for the integration of this informal
sector.  In Ciudad Juarez (Mexico), "Landfill scavengers were
organized into a recycling cooperative which obtained a
concession arrangement to operate the city landfill;" in Medellin
(Colombia), scavengers were organized into "small firms for
collecting commercial wastes and for purchasing recyclable
materials door-to-door" (Bartone 1991: 507).  Thus, the
improvement in refuse collection creates the least social
dislocation and best utilizes scarce skilled labor when it
encourages the informal participation of low-opportunity-cost
labor.
This integration of the informal sector can greatly facilitate
service expansion at low cost.  For example, in 1980 Cairo
(Egypt) initiated a pilot solid waste upgrading program to expand
service and fully recover costs.  From the start, Cairo took a
comprehensive approach to improving the wahi-zabbaleen system and
to increasing its capacity to handle growing waste generation.
The city began to organize the wahis and zabbaleen with modern
management and technology.  In the meantime, the government
offered incentives for them to invest in their trade and to
increase their productivity, such as granting land tenure to the
zabbaleen living in squatter settlements and providing them with
water and sewer services and paved roads.  By 1983, the service
provided by the traditional sector improved for the upper-income
communities with the addition of modern equipment and improved
donkey carts, and "more than 150,000 low-income Cairenes were
receiving regular house-hold solid waste collection service for
the first time" (Neamatalla "et al." 1985: 51).  Moreover, the
wahi-zabbaleen system provided equivalent levels of service to a
newly trained labor force, with costs reduced by 25 to 30%.
The trend in the now-industrialized countries is rapidly toward
highly mechanized, highly safe-guarded sanitary landfills.  It is
very possible that the developed countries are wasting resources
in becoming excessively careful with their landfills.  But it is
very certain that developing countries should not follow their
lead.  Solid waste is to a great extent not now collected and
disposed of at all in developing countries.  Simply getting it
out of residential areas, and especially congested residential
areas, would be a large step forward.  Simply "dumping" it in
"old-fashioned" landfills may be a very cost-effective way ofimproving the solid waste situation.  In short, if resources are
adequate only for collection or for disposal, collection is the
clear choice.
A wide range of technological choices is thus available for the
provision of water, sanitation, and solid waste services.
Moreover, the most appropriate choice is often the low-cost
technology that takes advantage of widely available unskilled
labor and provides a kind of service that matches both the
limited ability to pay and cultural traditions of poor
neighborhoods.  Since developing countries' investment in these
sectors is always constrained, low-cost technologies may prove
essential to alleviating the inadequate delivery of these
services to the urban poor.  By using low-cost technologies in
water supply and sanitation over the next 10 years, some 80% of
the now unserved population could be served at only one-third of
the total cost that would be needed to provide 100% coverage with
a mixture of high, intermediate, and low technologies (Christmas
1990: 27).
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
By the year 2000, 20 of the 25 largest cities on earth will be in
developing countries (Hamer and Linn 1987: 1256).  These cities
may be growing too rapidly, due to anti-rural and pro-industrial
biases in developing countries' development policies, but urban
growth is the inevitable by-product of economic growth.
Provision of environmental amenities in these developing country
cities has not kept pace with  urbanization.  Basic services,
such as water, sewage, and waste disposal, are poorly provided in
most of these cities and are especially poorly provided to the
poorest segments of the population.
The poor, everywhere, are poorly provided with many things.  Why
should one worry especially about the provision of water, sewage,
and waste disposal?  For two reasons.  First, the declining-cost
technology of these services makes them particularly badly
handled by the private sector, so that the poor have few market
substitutes to fall back on if public provision fails, and those
few market substitutes are likely to be monopoly-priced.  Second,
these services have important externalities, particularly in the
area of public health, so that even a well-functioning private
market would underprovide them.  "Privatization" of their
provision may be appropriate, but only if it is publicly planned
-- and possibly subsidized.
It is not as if cities must thrust these services down the
throats of the poor.  The poor, as well as the rich, in
developing country cities place a substantial value on access to
these services and, in fact, are willing to pay high prices for
private alternatives when public provision fails.  Non-market
data also suggest a high willingness to pay for water, sewage,and refuse collection.  External benefits, though more difficult
to quantify, are also substantial.
Where budgetary constraints preclude provision of "first class"
service to all urban residents, usually alternatives can be
provided.  Urban amenity provision is not an all-or-nothing
issue.
Furthermore, pricing is not an all-or-nothing proposition.  It is
not necessary that every person serviced by an urban amenity
cover the full cost ("i.e.", the marginal cost plus that person's
share of the interest and depreciation on the capital), nor is it
necessary that the poor be provided with optimal service
at zero cost.  Pricing systems can charge different amounts to
various people and still cover costs.  Pricing systems can lose
money and need subsidy from the general funds of the government
because they are justified by externality, public good, and merit
good arguments.   And gradations of service can be supplied to
different people within the same municipal jurisdiction.
The search for such differential pricing and provision schemes
has begun.  Prakash, 1987, recommends pricing residential water
in developing country cities -- and the idea is readily extended
to sewage and solid waste collection -- with lifeline tariffs in
the form of progressive block tariffs, where the first 20-40
liters per capita per day incur only a very low charge (:260).
High block tariffs for heavy water users could then recoup the
losses on the lifeline prices.  Linn, 1983, has pointed out that
it is primarily the large, once-and-for-all, initial connection
fee -- rather than the ongoing water service prices -- that
deters most of the poor from connecting up to city water, where
it is available.  Linn's point suggests a sequential, three-part
strategy:
1) start by providing long-term, commercial financing for
connection fees where households want them;
2) if many families cannot afford connections even with this
financing, subsidize the remaining household connections; and
3) if the city cannot afford subsidies of this magnitude, target
affordable subsidies to standpipes in poor neighborhoods (: 166).
In short, one can picture the urban poor in developing countries
as consisting of three groups:
1. People not now receiving adequate services who are quite
willing to pay their full costs.
2. People who can come close to paying the full costs.  For
these, externality and merit good arguments justify the provision
of basic services; and cross-subsidization, either from wealthier
recipients or from the general fund, can make such provision
practical.
3. The very poor, who are able to pay very little.  For these,
there are alternative, low-cost technologies.There are compelling arguments for providing basic urban
environmental services in developing country cities, perhaps even
on a subsidized basis, to everyone -- including the very poor.
Does this mean further increasing the "urban bias" of development
strategy?  It need not.  The urban poor need public provision of
water, sewage, and waste disposal services more than the rural
poor; the total cost of minimal provision of these services is
higher in urban than in rural areas; and the external benefits of
their provision are greater in urban than in rural areas.  These
three facts make such provision a higher priority in urban than
in rural areas.  An urban-rural balance in the provision of
public services does not mean an identical public expenditure on
identical services in the two areas.  To offset the greater
expenditure on water, sewage, and waste disposal appropriate for
the urban poor, developing countries should stand ready to incur
the greater expenses required to provide other services to the
rural poor, such as education, health, and transport.  The urban
poor should not benefit at the expense of the rural poor, but the
urban poor should benefit by receiving a more appropriate mix of
public and private services.
NOTES
1. Note the word, "directly."  Actions of consumers and providers
that affect others through their effects on market quantities and
prices ("i.e." "pecuniary externalities") do not cause market
failures.
2. In environmental applications, public "bads" are simply the
mirror image of public "goods" or services.  Cleaner air, or the
abatement of air pollution, is a public good; dirtier air, or the
creation of air pollution, is a public bad.
3. There are also environmental "demerit services," where the
political process chooses a maximum level of consumption that a
person may enjoy -- or that a person must endure -- for services
deemed harmful or where society, by some collective political
process, interferes to prevent individuals from irrational
overconsumption.
4. Sometimes a distinction is made between two kinds of "merit
services," those that will not be consumed by the poor because
they cannot afford them and those that are not consumed by
certain citizens because they are irrational (Besley 1988).  Our
use of the term implies the former.
5. See Todaro 1969, and Harris and Todaro 1970.
6. Sometimes policies are also noted that keep rural wages (or
rural labor opportunities) artificially low.7. The persistent misunderstanding of the structure and
activities of urban squatter settlements in the developing
countries has been labeled by Perlman, 1976, as "the myth of
marginality."
8. For lengthy documentation of anti-poor urban policies in the
developing countries, see Hardoy and Satterthwaite 1989, Chapter
2.
9. A 1983 United Nations survey of 126 developing countries'
governments found that only three countries considered the rural-
urban distribution of their populations to be "appropriate" and
that three-fourths of the countries were pursuing policies to
reduce or reverse the rate of rural-urban migration (Shukla and
Stark 1985: 297).
10. Throughout, the theory being discussed depends upon the
assumption that the income elasticity of demand for agricultural
products is less than one.  Evidence supporting this assumption -
- called Engel's Law -- has been accumulating for well over a
century.
11. As the 21st century approaches, improvements in
transportation and communication may be making the city -- or at
least the very large city -- less essential to manufacturing
growth, but such speculation is irrelevant here.
12. This costly by-product of rapid population growth has long
been noted (Coale and Hoover 1958).  It is worth noting that
rapid population growth, in itself, ought to lead to a slower,
not a faster, rate of growth of cities both by shifting demand
toward agricultural products and by providing greater labor for
the labor-intensive agricultural sector ("i.e.", the Rybczynski
effect).
13. The phrase, "on the cheap," is from Williamson 1990: 270.  He
continues, "Investment in housing and public works simply failed
to keep pace with the rest of Britain's economy in the first half
of the nineteenth century" (: 272).
14. Through much of the nineteenth century, it was known that
"people die more rapidly in cities than in rural districts,"
that there was "no inherent reason for the relatively high urban
mortality," and that the differential rate of mortality
disappeared with "sanitary improvements" (Weber 1899: 343, 367).
15. Nor was the United States very fast to provide urban
environmental services (Melosi 1981, Ch.1).
16. See Rosenberg and Birdzell 1986: 175ff, and Williamson 1990,
Chapters 9 and 10.  Wohl 1983, argues that this neglect of
environmental services was due to two forces: 1) capital-market
failure, which made it difficult for cities to borrow for the
capital investment in urban infrastructure; and 2) public-sector
failure, which gave heavy voting weight to the groups who would
have been  most heavily taxed to pay for such infrastructure
investment.  Also see Brown 1988.  Kearns 1989, argues that"environmentalism required interventionism" (: 120), and
interventionism was something nineteenth-century European cities
were slow to accept.
17. Using the regression of solid waste per capita on GNP per
capita estimated by Shafik and Bandyopadhyay 1992: 27, one can
derive the additional solid waste produced by each additional
dollar of GNP.  For countries at GNP per capita of US$100, each
additional GNP dollar generates 0.21 kilograms of solid waste; at
GNP per capita of US$10,000, 0.01 kilograms. (Hereafter, the $
sign always refers to the US$.)
18. Simple regressions of (the logs of) various measures of
developing countries' environmental welfare on (the log of) per
capita GDP (for example, Shafik and Bandyopadhyay 1992: 27)
confirm both the slight positive relation and the high variance:
Dependent Variable             Income Elasticity       R2
Percent with Safe Water               0.12            0.43
Percent with Sanitation               0.14            0.22
Solid Waste Collected                 0.38            0.60
The safe-water regression reported in the above table is actually
the percent without safe water, adjusted by us to estimate the
above elasticity.  The safe water regression is for the rural as
well as the urban population; the bottom two regressions are for
urban only.  The top two income elasticity estimates are
calculated at 80% coverage for water and sanitation.   The R2
figures are adjusted.
19. This means the percentage of the African population that is
urbanized has been growing at 2.3% during the 1980s.
20. The regression analysis uses cross-section data for 56
developing countries, all those for which we could find complete
data in WHO 1983, and UNDP 1991.  The dependent variables are the
1980 urban percentage coverage rates for water supply and for
sanitation.  The exact definitions of the four independent
variables are as follows:  GNP per capita (in 1980, in thousands
of dollars); GNP per capita growth rate (real, during 1980-88, in
percent per annum); population growth rate (in 1980, in percent
per annum); and the percentage of the population living in urban
areas (in 1980, in percent).  Since the dependent variables are
bounded by 0 and 100, and the lower bound is not actually
binding, a Tobit regression model is used to estimate the
coefficients; the ordinary least-squares (OLS) regressions are
also reported.
21. The results are reasonably robust.  Replicating the above
regressions using a different data set (World Bank 1922b and UNDP
1991) yields similar conclusions.  There, GNP per capita becomes
a more significant determinant and the urbanization percentage a
less significant determinant (though still a strong positive
force on coverage).
22. One cubic meter equals one kiloliter ("i.e.", 1000 liters).
The exponential is just another example of "the rule of twothirds" that often appears in the cost functions of processes
that treat or transport fluids.
23. The cost of water without sewage is not estimated in this
source.
24. Depreciation and interest costs added another $0.10 per cubic
meter.
25. The wide range in cost reflects differential technical
factors, particularly of terrain and soil.
26. In this project, however, sewage treatment was expected to be
minimal.
27. It is difficult to "bond" private firms for distant
obligations, and it is impractical to make them carry insurance
or form "contingency funds" when the potential amounts are so
large and so uncertain.
28. The monopoly price could, in principle, fail to cover the
full cost, but we will not further consider this.
29. Full-cost pricing, ("i.e.", pricing at average total cost)
refers to both the operation and maintenance cost ("i.e.",
average variable cost) and the interest and depreciation cost
("i.e.", average fixed cost).
30. The concept of marginal cost (or incremental cost) is clear
enough -- it is the cost of producing one additional unit of
output.  The shadings of meaning to the criterion of "marginal
cost pricing" derive from the question, marginal what cost?
31. In practice, what is called "long-run marginal cost" is
usually an estimate of the per-unit cost of operation,
maintenance, depreciation, and interest in the next planned stage
of expansion.
32. Such expansion cost, and hence the long-run marginal cost
that incorporates it can be very high indeed:
"In Mexico City [Mexico]...the city has to contemplate pumping
water over an elevation exceeding 1,000 meters...in Lima [Peru]
upstream pollution has increased treatment costs by about 30%; in
Shanghai [China] water intakes have already been moved upstream
more than 40 kilometers, at a cost of about $300 million; and in
Amman [Jordan] the most recent works involve pumping water up
1,200 meters from a site about 40 kilometers from the city (World
Bank 1922b: 101)."
33. Either way, many utilities then find that inflation seriously
erodes the value of these "mortgage" assets.  Such random
redistribution serves no sensible policy goal.
34. The World Bank has been encouraging this kind of pricing for
several years; as of 1977, it had been implemented in 21 of the
36 developing countries that had borrowed from the World Bank forwater projects and that had metered connections  (Linn 1983:
189).
35. A cross-subsidy refers to the system of pricing where profit
is earned on the sale of some services in order to cover losses
on the sale of others.
36. Efficiency arguments, for water especially, can be
exaggerated.  Over most relevant ranges, price elasticity of
demand for water is so low -- usually -0.3 to -0.6 (Gomez 1983:
2) -- that the deadweight loss associated with inefficient prices
represents only a small fraction of the total value of
consumption.
37. Most household water in developing cities is used for
drinking, cooking, and watering vegetable gardens; a much greater
percentage of industrial water winds up in the sewage system.
However, the proportion of water assumed to enter the sewage
system may be a "political" estimate, that is, not necessarily an
accurate estimate of reality but one intended to reallocate the
burden of support for the sewage system from households to
businesses.
38. These prices seem very high, but this is due to our
conversion to dollars at the over-valued exchange rate.
39. Bucket latrines and aqua privies are relatively simple,
temporary storage systems that must be emptied regularly.  Bucket
latrines utilize open storage and must be emptied at least twice
a week;  aqua privies utilize a compartmentalized, water-filled
storage tank and may be left for longer intervals.
40. For a fuller description of these VIP systems, see the
Appropriate Technologies section.
41. Only about 60% of the septic tanks, however, are desludged on
a regular basis.  The rest "routinely overflow and discharge to
street drains and ditches, making WCs ["i.e.", toilets] one of
the most poorly operated sanitation systems in the city"
(Whittington "et al." 1991a: 120).
42. The public latrines charge a fee of $0.02 per visit for most
adults; children and the elderly are admitted free.
43. The 200 liter drum is the well-understood standard unit of
measure for water in Onitsha.  To avoid "starting point bias,"
the survey randomly offered respondents either a relatively high
proposed starting bid or a relatively low one.
44. "i.e.", raising prices beyond that level would lead to
falling revenues due to the loss of large numbers of potential
customers.
45. Only price is needed to estimate marginal willingness to pay,
but, to estimate the total benefit of a large water project, one
needs estimates of consumers' willingness to pay.46. Interestingly, respondents did not complain about the lack of
cleanliness of the public toilets.
47. A calculation error in the article incorrectly specifies
$0.53 per hour  (: 273).
48. While this method is widely utilized by the legal profession,
it runs into serious logical and ethical objections.  For
example, is the value of a retired or disabled person's life
zero?  Or for another example, where women earn less than men
because of occupational or wage discrimination, does this mean
that their deaths are socially of lower cost?
49. For studies undertaken in Asia, see Shin et al. 1992.
50. Alternatively, one estimates the willingness to accept (WTA)
compensation for a specific worsening in health status.  In
theory, at the margin, most WTP and WTA valuations should be very
close.  Any discrepancy between WTP and WTA is brought about by
income effects when we are dealing with outcomes without good
substitutes.  Public services with no close substitutes may
display a large discrepancy between WTP and WTA; and in practice,
many studies have turned up considerable discrepancies between
WTP and WTA estimates, with WTA valuations sometimes many times
higher than WTP valuations (Cropper and Oases 1993: 702, 711).
51. "i.e.", life expectancy at birth.
52. On the other hand, simply adding all the value of the health-
related benefits to the value of private willingness to pay would
involve extensive double-counting of the benefits.
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